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This is the second of a two-part article on the law of 
confessions. The first part discussed evidentiary issues, 
the due process voluntariness test, and several Miranda 
issues. This article completes the discussion of Miranda, 
commencing with the issue of waiver. It also examines 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the derivative 
evidence rule. 
Waiver 
Like most constitutional rights, the Fifth Amendment 
can be waived. In Miranda the Court wrote: "An individu-
al need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. 
While such request affirmatively secures his right to have 
one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a 
waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during 
interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made 
after the warnings we here delineate have been given." 
384 U.S. at 470. The Court went on to state: "But a valid 
waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of 
the accused after warnings are given or simply from the 
fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained." /d. 
at 475. 
The Court provided further guidance on the waiver 
issue in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979). 
Butler was arrested by the FBI in New York for crimes 
committed in North Carolina. After being read his Miran-
da rights by the arresting agent, Butler refused to sign a 
waiver form but nonetheless made an incriminating 
statement. The Court found a valid waiver, noting that the 
defendant had stated: "I will talk to you but I am not sign-
ing any form." Although it upheld the conviction, the 
Court again emphasized the heavy burden the prosecu-
tion must bear in establishing a valid Waiver: 
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right 
to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong 
proof of the validity of that waiver, but it is not inevitably 
either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The ques-
tion is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in 
fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated 
in the Miranda case. As was unequivocally said in Miranda, 
mere silence is not enough. That does not mean that the 
defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his 
rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never 
support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights. 
Public Defender Hyman Friedman 
The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his 
rights; the prosecution's burden is great; but in at least some 
cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and 
words of the person interrogated. /d. at 373. 
The Court also considered a waiver issue in Tague v. 
Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) (per curiam). In that case 
the officer who obtained the confession testified that he 
read the Miranda rights from a card but could not remem-
ber what those rights were or whether he had asked the 
defendant if he understood the rights as read. The Court 
reversed: "In this case no evidence at all was introduced 
to prove that petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived 
his rights before making the inculpatory statement. The 
statement was therefore inadmissible." /d. at 471. 
Multiple Interrogations 
One type of waiver issue has produced much litigation. 
The issue is: Under what circumstances may a suspect 
who has previously invoked his Miranda rights waive 
those rights in a susbsequent interrogation? The Court's 
cases on this issue indicate that the answer to this ques-
tion depends on whether the defendant claims only the 
right to remain silent or also claims the right to an attor-
ney. 
Right to Silence 
The first case decided by the Court on this issue was 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Mosley was read 
his Miranda rights after being arrested for robbery. At that 
time he indicated that he did not want to answer ques-
tions and the interrogation ceased. Subsequently, a sec-
ond police officer questioned him about a homicide. 
Again Miranda warnings were read. According to the 
Court, Miranda requires the police to "scrupulously hon-
or" a defendant's decision to remain silent. In the Court's 
view, the conduct of the police in Mosley satisfied that 
standard: 
This is not a case ... where the police failed to honor a deci-
sion of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by 
refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by 
persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance 
and make him change his mind. In contrast to such prac-
, tices, the police here immediately ceased the interrogation, 
resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant 
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and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had 
not been a s_llbject of the earliefinterrogation./d. at 105-06. 
One difficulty with Mosley concerns its applicability un-
der somewhat different circumstances; The Court em-
phasized several factors: the second interrogation 
involved a differ~nt crime, was conducted by a different 
officer, and occurred after a lapse of time (2 hours). It is 
unclear hbvit the Court would have decided the issue had 
one of these factors differed. 
Right to Counsel 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), presented the 
Court with the right to counsel issue absent in Mosley. 
Mosely asserted only the right to remain silent At some 
point in the_ initial interrogation, EdvJards asserted the 
right to counsel. The questioning ceased and Edwards 
was taken to a jail cell. The following morning two detec-
tives visited him, stating that they wanted to talk. They 
read Edwards his Miranda rights again, Edwards sub-
sequently confessed. The Supreme Court reversed. 
Instead of appfying the Mosley analysis, the Court adopt-
ed a different approach: 
"[A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with 
the police only through counsel, is not subjecno further in-
terrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
police." /d. at 484-85 (emphasis added). 
Several later cases clarified the Edwards rule. In Wy-
rick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (per curiam), the ac-
cused requested a polygraph test after receiving Miranda 
warnings. According to the Court this request satisfied 
the Edwards initiation requirement and his waiver en-
compassedpost-test questioning as well as the ques-
tions askedwhile-attached tothepalygraph, 
_Despite Edwards and Wyrick, the lower courts re-
mained divided over the relationship between the initia-
tion requirement and the waiver requirement. Some 
courts treated them as distinct requirements, while other 
courts viewed "initiation" as only one factor in determin-
ing waiver. The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in 
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). Soon after 
asserting his right to counsel, Bradshaw asked, "Well, 
what is going to happen to me now?" A conversation fol-
lowed in which Bradshaw agreed to take a polygraph 
test. At the conclusion of the test, he made an incrimina-
tory statem.E:)nt. The plurality opinion took the position 
that Edwards requires a two-step analysis: (1) did the 
defendant initiate the communication, and (2) did he 
waive his Mirarida rights. These inquiries are distinct and 
both "initiafion"andwaivei" are required asa prerequi-
site to the admission of the statement. On this issue, the 
dissenting Justices concurred and thus a majority of the 
Court_ agreed on this two-step approach. 
Nevertheless, Bradshaw lost his appeal because the 
plurality believed that his statement ("Well, what is going 
to happen to me now?") satisfied the initiation prong. 
Although the plurality acknowledged that some state-
ments such as those requesting a drink of water or the 
use of a telephone would not constitute "initiation," Brad-
shaw's question, though ambiguous, "evinced a willing-
ness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the 
investigation." /d. at 1045-46. This view of facts by the 
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four-Justice plurality coupled with Justice Powell's 
concurrence was enough to doom Bradshaw's appeal. 
Last term, the Court decided a somewhat different 
issue concerning the applicability of Edwards. In Smith v. 
Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490 (1984), after being informed of his 
right to counsel, the defendant replied, "Uh, yeah. I'd like 
to do that." When asked whether he would be willing to 
talk without counsel, he said, "Yeah and no, wh, I don't 
know what's what, really." Nevertheless, he went on to 
make incriminating statements. On review, the Court held 
the statements inadmissible. Smith dealt with the thresh-
oldq[J{?§tio!l under £dwards- whether the right to coun-
sel had been asserted. The Court found that the initial 
assertion of the right to counsel was unambiguous and 
the defendant's subsequent conduct could not be used 
to make the assertion ambiguous. "[A]n accused's post-
request responses to further interrogation may not be 
used to cast doubt on the clarity of this initial request for 
counsel." /d. at 491. 
A related issue concerning the assertion of the right to 
counsel was raised in United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1 
(1st Cir. 1985). In tha:t case the court held that an unsuc-
cessful telephone call to an attorney invoked the right to 
counsel. According to the court, a DEA agent who was 
present at the time the call was made should have in-
formed the interrogating officer of the call. /d. at 6-7. 
Misdemeanor Exception 
On several occasions the Court has been asked to 
recognize exceptions to Miranda. For example, a number 
of lower courts had held that Miranda warnings were not 
required for misdemeanor offenses. See State v. Pyle, 19 
Ohio St.2d 64, 68, 249 N.E.2d 826, 828 (1969) ("We hold 
that the ruling in Miranda ... is not applicable to misde-
meanors .... "), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970). In 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984), the Court 
refused to accept such an exception: Miranda does not 
depend on "the nature or severity of the offense of which 
he is suspected or for which he was arrested." /d. at 3148. 
According to the Court, such an exception would create 
numerous difficulties for the police. The police often are 
unaware when they arrest a person whether he may have 
committed a misdemeanor or felony. Moreover, investi-
gations into seemingly minor offenses sometimes esca-
late gradually into investigations into more serious mat-
ters. See also State v. Buchholz, 11 Ohio St.3d 24, 462 
N.E.2d 1222 (1984) (overruling Pyle); 14 Cap. U. L. Rev. 
127 (1985). However, as McCarty makes clear, there is 
often no custody in this context and for that reason, 
Miranda is inapplicable. 
Public Safety Exception 
In New York v. Quarles, 104 S.Ct. 2626 (1984), the Su-
preme Court considered a public safety exception to 
Miranda. The defendant in Quarles was arrested soon 
after the police were informed by a rape victim that a man 
fitting his description had attacked her. The complaint 
included the fact that the rapist had a gun. At the time of 
his arrest, the defendant was wearing an empty shoulder 
holster. After handcuffing the defendant, the arresting of- 11 
ficer asked where the gun was and the defendant J 
responded, "The gun is over there." 
On review, the Supreme Court recognized for the first 
time a public safety exception to Miranda: "We hold that 
on these facts there is a 'public safety' exception to 
[Miranda), and that the availability of that exception does 
not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers 
involved." /d. at 2632. According to the Court, "So long 
as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermar-
ket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously 
posed more than one danger to the public safety: an 
accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employ-
ee might later come upon it." /d. at 2632. The Court went 
on to hold that in such a situation the threat to the public 
safety outweighed the need for Miranda's prophylactic 
rule protecting the Fifth Amendment. 
Although the Court labeled the public safety exception 
a "narrow exception," it failed to provide much guidance 
on its applicability. Despite the Court's assertions, there 
vvas no eyidence of an accomplice, nor 'IJas there any ev-
idence that the police could not have "sealed off" the 
area and searched for the weapon. The need for the ex-
ception, at least under the facts of the case, does not 
seem compelling. A far more persuasive argument for an 
exception is present in what has come to be known as 
the "rescue doctrine" cases, in which some courts had 
recognized an exception to Miranda where a defendant is 
questioned about the whereabouts of a kidnapping vic-
tim. See 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 
508-09 (1984). 
Few cases have applied this new exception. People v. 
Cole, 165 Cal. App.3d 41,211 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1985), was 
one of the first cases. The court, applying Quarles, held 
that an inquiry about a stolen kitchen knife comes within 
the public safety exception. In contrast, the court in 
People v. Roundtree, 125111. App.3d 1075, 482 N.E.2d 
593 (1985), found the exception inapplicable where the 
jefendants were all handcuffed and the scene was se-
::ured by the police. See also Comment, New York v. 
Quarles: The Public Safety Exception to Miranda, 70 Iowa 
L. Rev. 1075 (1985); 26 Ariz. L.J. 967 (1984); 23 Duq. L. 
Rev. 805 (1985); 36 Mercer L. Rev. 1059 (1985); 19 U. 
Rich. L. Rev. 193 (1984); 87 W.Va. L. Rev. 381 (1985). 
Impeachment Exception 
In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the defen-
jantdenied on direct examination that he knew the na-
ture of the substance that he had sold to an undercover 
officer. According to his testimony, he was attempting to 
jefraud the officer by selling him baking powder. On cross-
3Xamination, the prosecutor questioned him about incrim-
nating statements he had made at the time of arrest. The 
orosecution conceded that the statements had been ob-
:ained in violation of Miranda because the defendant had 
1ot been warned of his right to appointed counsel. 
On review, the Supreme Court upheld the impeach-
1lent use of the statements: 
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own 
defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be 
construed to include the right to commit perjury .... Having 
voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obliga-
tion to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution 
here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing 
devices of the adversary process .... 
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a 
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk 
of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. /d. at 
225-26. 
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The Court also considered the impeachment issue in 
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), and reached the 
same conclusion. 
Several courts have considered whether the impeach-
ment exception recognized by Harris applies to witness-
es other than the defendant. These attempts to extend 
Harris have failed. In United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 
115 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the prosecution wanted to impeach 
defense psychiatrists with the defendant's illegally ob-
tained statements in order to rebut an insanity defense. 
The court rejected such use: 
· · Were we to curtail the exclusionary rule in the drastic man-
ner the government urges, we would provide little or no 
deterrence of constitutional violations against defendants 
whose sanity is the principal issue in the case. The govern-
ment would be able, under the guise of rebuttal, to use any 
illegally obtained evidence relevant to the principal issue in 
the case:..__ insanity./d. at134. 
See also State v. Burnett, 637 S.W.2d 680, 689-90 (Mo. 
1982) (illegally seized evidence cannot be used to im-
peach defense witnesses); State v. Hubbard, 103 
Wash.2_d 570, 693 P.2d 718, 722 (1985). 
The impeachment exception applies only to state-
ments obtained in violation of Miranda. As noted earlier, it 
does not apply to statements obtained in violation of the 
due process voluntariness test. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 
U.S. 385 (1978). Nordoes it apply to statements obtained 
in violation of the right to counsel. See infra. 
Silence 
The Court has refused to extend the impeachment 
exception to situations in which a suspect remains silent 
after receiving Miranda warnings. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610 (1976), the Court wrote: 
Silence in the wake of [Miranda} warnings may be nothing 
more than the arrestee's exercise of [his] Miranda rights. 
Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous 
because of what the State is required to advise the person 
arrested .... Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda warn-
ings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no 
penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who re-
ceives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be 
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to 
allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an 
explanation subsequently offered at triaL/d. at 617-18. 
The Court's reasoning is critical. Although the circum-
stances implicate Miranda, the Court did not rely on the 
Fifth Amendment. Doyle is a due process case. The cen-
terpiece of the Court's analysis is an estoppel theory; the 
prosecution should be estopped from using a defen-
dant's silence as evidence of guilt when the police in-
duced that silence by giving the Miranda warnings. It is 
this aspect of Doyle that explains the Court's later cases. 
In Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curi-
am), the defendant did not remain silent after receiving 
Miranda warnings. Consequently, there was no govern-
mental inducement to remain silent: "But Doyle does not 
apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior 
inconsistent statements. Such questioning makes no 
unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntari-
ly speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been 
induced to remain silent. As to the subject matter of his 
statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all." 
!d. at 408. 
!! 
Jenkins-v."Anderson, 447 U.S. 231·· (-1980); involved a 
case of pre-arrest silence. The defendant surrendered 
two weeks after he killed someone. When he testified 
that he had killed in self-defense, the prosecution ques-
tioned him about his delay in surrendering and 
commented in closing argument that the defendant 
"waited two weeks, according to the testimony- at least 
two weeks before he did anything about surrendering 
himself or reporting [the stabbing] to anybody." /d. at 234. 
Again, the Court relied on Doyle's inducement theory in 
holding that evidence of silence was admissible: "[N]o 
governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent 
before arrest. The failure to speak occurred before the 
petitioner was taken into custody and given Miranda 
warni~gs. Consequently, the fundamental unfairness 
present in Doyle is not present in this case." !d. at 240. 
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982), involved post-
arrest silence. However, no warnings were given. Here, 
too, the inducement theory proved critical: "In the ab-
sence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in 
the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates 
due process of law for a State to permit cross-examin-
ation as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses 
to take the stand." /d. at 607. 
Recently, the Court considered another Doyle issue. In 
Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S.Ct. 634 (1986), the prose-
cutor used the defendant's post-Miranda warnings si-
lence as substantive evidence of the defendant's sanity. 
The Court found that Doyle controlled and reversed. The 
Court commented: 
The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally 
unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not 
be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise 
by using silence to Impeach his trial testimony. It is equally 
unfair to breach.that promise by using silence to overcome a 
defendant's plea of insanity./d: ·at 639. 
Other Proceedings 
In several cases the Court has considered the applica-
bility of Miranda to proceedings other than trial. 
Prison Disciplinary Hearings 
In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), the Court 
refused to apply Miranda to prison disciplinary proceed-
ings in which the charged conduct also constituted a 
crime under state law: "The Court has never held, and 
we decline to do so now, that the requirements of [Miran-
da) must be met to render pretrial statements admissible 
in other than criminal cases." /d. at 315. 
Grand Jury Proceedings 
In United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), a 
plurality of the Court stated that Miranda warnings were 
not required when a grand jury witness is questioned 
about criminal conduct in which the witness may have 
been involved. The plurality viewed the grand jury proc-
ess as fundamentally different from the police interroga-
tion process: 
[The Miranda] warnings were aimed at the evils seen by the 
Court as endemic to police interrogation of a person in 
custody. Miranda addressed extrajudicial confessions or 
admissions procured in a hostile, unfamiliar environment 
which lacked procedural safeguards_ ... But the Miranda 
Court simply did not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial 
interrogation as equivalents: "[T]he compulsion to speak in 
the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater 
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than in courts or other official investigations, where there are 
often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or 
trickery." /d. at 576. 
Juvenile Cases 
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), involved the ap-
plicability of Miranda in juvenile court proceedings. The 
Court's holding in the case was narrow. The Court held 
only that a juvenile's request to speak with his probation 
officer, after receiving Miranda warnings, was not a per 
se invocation of the right to remain silent. In a footnote , 
however, the Court raised a question about the applica-
tion of Miranda in this context: 
[T)his Court has f1Qt yet held that Miranda applies with full 
force to exclude,evidemce obtained in violation of its pro-
scriptions from consideration in juvenile proceedings, which 
for certain puq)oseshave been distinguished from formal 
criminal prosecutions .... We do not decide that issue 
today. In view of our disposition of this case, we assume 
without deciding that the Miranda principles were fully appli-
cable to the present proceedings. /d. at 717 n.4. 
Most lower courts, however, have applied Miranda to ju-
venile cases. See In re Dennis M., 70 Cal.2d 444, 450 
P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969); In re A.A. H., 314 A.2d 
133 (D.C. 1974); State v. Whatley, 320 So.2d 123 (La .. 
1975); State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671 
(1973); In re Robert 0., 109 N.Y. Misc.2d 238, 439 N.Y.S.2d 
994 (Fam. Ct. 1981). See also W. Kurtz & P. Giannelli, 
Ohio Juvenile Law ch. 5 (1985). 
Death Penalty Hearings 
In one situation, the Court did extend Miranda. In 
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the prosecution in-
troduced expert psyc:hiatric testimony on the issue of the 
defendant's future dangerousness during a death penal-
ty hearing. The testimony was based on an interview with 
the defendant, which had been conducted by the state's 
expert. The Court ruled that Miranda warnings were re-
quired under these facts: 
The consideration [articulated in Miranda) calling for the 
accused to be warned prior to custodial interrogatio'n apply 
with no less force to the pretrial psychiatric examination at 
issue here. Respondent was [in jail) when the examination 
was ordered and when it was conducted .... When Dr. Grig-
son went beyond simply reporting to the Court on the issue. 
of competence and testified for the prosecution at the penal-
ty phase on the crucial issue of respondent's future de~nger­
ousness, his role changed and became essentially like that 
of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements 
made in a postarrest custodial setting. /d. at 467. 
State Constitutional Law 
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court may limit the 
reach of Miranda under the federal Constitution, a state 
may provide greater protection to a defendant under the 
self-incrimination clause of a state constitution. The Su-
preme Court has recognized this principle in a number of 
its confession cases. For example, in Oregon v. Hass, 
420 U.S. 714 (1975), the Court wrote: "[A] state is free as a 
matter of its own Jaw to impose greater restrictions on 
police activity than those this Court holds to be neces-
sary upon federal constitutional standards." /d at 719. 
See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324 
(1982); Sedler, The State Constitutional Law in Ohio and 
the Nation, 16 U. Tol. L. Rev. 391 (1985). 
A number of state supreme courts have accepted this 
invitation and imposed restrictions on police interroga-
tion procedures. For example, several courts_have reject-
ed the impeachment exception to Miranda on state law 
grounds. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal.3d 101, 113,545 
P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368 (1976); State v. 
Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 265-67, 492 P.2d 657, 664-65 
(1971); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 249, 341 
A.2d 62, 64 (1915). Similarly, the California Supreme 
Court has rejected Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 
(1975), and held that an accused's invocation of the right 
to-silence bars police from subjecting him again to custo-
dial interrogation, even for another crime .. People v. 
Pettingill, 21 Cal.3d 231, 248-49, 578 P.2d 108, 118-19, 145 
Cal. Rptr. 861,871-72 (1978). In Commonwealth v. Bussey, 
486 Pa. 221, 230,404 A.2d 1309, 1314 (1979), the Penn= 
sylvania Supreme Court rejected North Carolina v. Butler 
on state constitutional grounds. 
In at least one case, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on 
state grounds in resolving a confession issue. Ohio v. 
Gallagher, 425 U.S. 257 (1976), involved an in-custody 
parolee who was questioned by his parole officer without 
being informed of his Miranda rights. The U.S. Supreme 
Court, however, did not resolve the issue. Instead, the 
case was remanded"to determine whether the Ohio 
Supreme Court rested its decision upon the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States, or Art. 1, § 10, of the Ohio Constitution, or 
both." /d. at 259. On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court re-
affirmed its prior decisions, which required warnings, on 
state constitutional grounds. State v. Gallagher, 46 Ohio 
St. 2d 225, 348 N.E. 2d 336 (1976). 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
In 1964 the Supreme Court explicitly relied, for the first 
time, on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to exclude 
a confession. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 
(1964), the defendant made a statement to an accom-
plice after he had been indicted, retained counsel, and 
released on bail. Unknown to Massiah, his accomplice 
had agreed to cooperate with the police. The Court held 
that Massiah's Sixth Amendment rights had been violat-
ed because the police had "deliberately elicited" incrim-
inatory statements after the right to counsel had 
attached. /d. at 206. Shortly after this decision, the Court 
decided Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Again, 
the Court relied on the right to counsel to suppress a 
confession. 
Miranda was decided in 1966 and changed the focus 
of analysis to the Fifth Amendment. For the next decade, 
Sixth Amendment issues remained dormant. In later 
decisions, the Court emphasized that Escobedo had 
been displaced by Miranda. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 687 (1972) ("prime purpose of Escobedo was not to 
vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, but, 
like Miranda, to guarantee full effectuation of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination."); United States v. 
Gouveia, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2298 n. 5 (1984) ("we have 
made clear that we required counsel in Miranda and 
Escobedo in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination rather than to vindicate 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."). 
The Massiah decision, however, was mostly forgotten 
5 
after Miranda. One commentator has written that 
Massiah "was apparently lost in the shuffle of fast-mov-
ing events that reshaped constitutional-criminal proce-
dure in the 1960s." Y. Kamisar, Police Interrogation and 
Confession 160 (1980). In 1977, however, the Court re-
vived Massiah and again applied the right to counsel to 
exclude a confession. 
In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), a murder de-
fendant surrendered and was being returned to Des 
Moines, Iowa, when he made incriminatory statements. 
During this trip a detective gave what has become known 
as the "Christian Burial" speech, in which he pointed out 
that weather conditions might make discovery of the vic-
tim's body impossible and that the "parents of this little 
girl should be entitled to a Christian burial of the little 
giri .... " id. at 393. The Court heid that "once adversary 
proceedings have commenced against an individual, he 
has a right to legal representation when the government 
interrogates him." /d. at 401. 
In 1980 the Court again relied on the right to counsel in 
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), and ruled 
statements obtained in a "jail plant" case inadmissible 
on Sixth Amendment grounds. In Henry the defendant 
was held pending trial after being indicted for bank .rob-
bery. The police contacted an inmate who had been a 
government informant and instructed him to be alert to 
any statements made by several federal prisoners but not 
to initiate any conversation with or question Henry re-
garding the bank robbery. The Court held that state-
ments made by Henry to the informant violated the right 
to counsel. 
The Sixth Amendment line of cases differs from Miran-
da in a number of respects and offers an independent 
vehicle to suppress confessions. As one court has noted: 
"The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is analytically 
distinct from the Fifth Amendment right created by Miran-
da." United States v. Karr, 742 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 
1984). The right to counsel analysis raises two issues: 
first, when does the right attach, and second, when have 
the police "deliberately elicited" an incriminatory state- · 
ment. 
Attachment of Right to Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Accordingly, the 
threshold inquiry is when a "criminal prosecution" 
commences. In Massiah, the progenitor of this line of 
cases, the defendant had been indicted and thus the 
Court readily found that the right to counsel had already 
attached at the time the statement was made. In Brewer 
v. Williams the defendant had not yet been indicted and 
the Court nevertheless found that the right to counsel 
had attached. According to the Court: 
There can be no doubt in the present case that judicial 
proceedings had been initiated against Williams before the 
start of the automobile ride from Davenport to Des Moines. A 
warrant had been issued for his arrest, he had been 
arraigned on that warrant before a judge in a Davenport 
courtroom, and he had been committed by the court to 
confinement in jail. /d. at 399. 
In recognizing that the right to counsel attached some-
time before indictment, Williams followed earlier cases 
involving the Sixth Amendment in lineup situations. See 
Kirbyv.ci!Hnois,"406U.S.682,689 (1972) (judicial . 
proceedings commence with the "formal charge, prelimi-
nary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment"); 
Moorewlllinois, 434 U.S. 220,228 (1977) (prosecution 
commenced when "the victim's complaint was filed in 
court."). 
The precise point in a criminal case at which the Sixth 
Amendment is triggered, however, is unclear. The 
Court's later confession cases do not address this issue. 
In United States v. Gouveia, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2297-300 
(1984), the defendants argued that the right to counsel 
had attached to prisoners in administrative segregation. 
Since even the initial stages of a criniinan)rosec:ution 
had not yet commenced, the Court rejected this argu-
ment. In both United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), 
and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454; 469-70 (1981), the 
defendants had been indicted and the right to counsel 
clearly had attached. 
Considered together, the Court's Sixth Amendment 
confession and lineup cases provide some guidance. 
Under Kirb~ an arrest alone does nottrigger the right to 
counsel. See United States v. Muzychka, 725 F.2d 1061, 
1068 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2390 (1984). On the 
other hand, it is clear that the right to counsel attaches by 
the time of a preliminary hearing. Moore v. Illinois, 434 
U.S. 220, 228 (1977). Moreover, Brewer v. Williams estab-
lishes'that the right to counsel attaches even earlier than 
the preliminary hearing, although it is not clear exactly 
when. The lower courts are divided on whether a 
complaint and/or arrest warrant triggers the right to coun-
sel. The Supreme Court has declined to decide this 
issue. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 480 n.7 
(1~§11-:..~QIJie 99Jlf't§ b~Y~ ,!:JeldJt!at iwdicial proceedings 
commence with the filing of a complaint. E.g., People v. 
Curtis, 132111~ App.3d241, 476 N.E.2d 1162, 1168 (1985). 
Other courts have heT<ftfiat ani.Jnexecutei::l arrest warrant 
does not trigger judicial proceedings. United States v. 
Reynolds, 762 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1985). 
Similarly, courts are split over whether an initial 
appearance triggers the right to counsel. Compare Ross 
v. State, 254 Ga. 22, 326 S.E.2d 194, 200 (initial appear-
ance does not trigger right to counsel), cert. denied, 105 
S.Ct.3490 (1985), with People v. Bladel, 421 Mich. 39, 
365 N.W.2d 56, 62 (1984) (initial arraignment triggers 
right), cert. granted sub nom. Michigan v. Jackson, 105 
S.Ct. 2654 (1985). Brewerv. Williams seems to indicate 
that the right to counsel has attached by this time, since 
one of the factors mentioned by the Court was the defen-
dant's arraignment. 
Although there is some uncertainty about the exact 
time at Which the right to counsel attaches, it is clear that 
this inquiry is very different from the Miranda issue of 
"custodial interrogation." Sweat v. Arkansas, 105 S.Ct. 
933 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (lower court found that right to counsel had not 
attached because the accused was not under arrest or 
deprived of his freedom). Custody under Miranda clearly 
occurs with an arrest but an arrest alone does not trigger 
the right to counsel. Moreover, once a defendant is indict-
ed and released on bail, he is no longer in custody and 
yet the right to counsel has attached. This was the situa-
tion in Massiah. There are, of course, times when both 
Miranda and the right to counsel would apply. Brewer v. 
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Williams is illustrative, although the Court decided only 
the Sixth Amendment issue in that case. 
"Deliberately Elicit" Test 
Once the right to counsel has attached, it still must be 
determined what type of police conduct violates the right. 
In Massiah the Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
prohibits law enforcement officers from "deliberately elic-
it[ing]" incriminating statements once the right attached. 
One initial problem is determining whether "deliberate 
elicitation" under the Sixth Amendment is the same as 
"interrogation" under Miranda. Although the Court 
seemed to.equate interrogation and deliberat~ elicitation 
in Brewer, later cases have distinguished the two terms. 
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the Court 
wrote in a footnote: 
There is language in the opinion of the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court in this case suggesting that the definition of 
"interrogation" under Miranda is informed by this Court's 
decision in Brewer v. Williams . ... This suggestion is errone-
ous .... The definitions of "interrogation" under the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term "interrogation" is 
even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not necessari-
ly interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two 
constitutional protections are quite distinct. /d. at 300 n.4. 
In other words, interrogation would qualify as deliberate 
elicitation but so would other police conduct. This point is 
illustrated by United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), 
in which the Court found a Sixth Amendment violation 
where the police requested a jail informant, pursuant to a 
contingent fee arrangement, to be alert to any statements 
made by the defendant. Even without interrogation, the 
right to counsel was violated: "By intentionally creating a 
situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating 
statements without the assistance of counsel, the 
Government violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.'' /d. at 274. See also McCubbin v. State, 675 P.2d 
461 (Okla. Grim. App. 1984) (fact that the private detec-
tive who was planted in jail did not question accused is 
immaterial) (listing other cases). 
Recent Cases 
This term the Court has decided to review two cases 
that may provide a vehicle for clarifying some of these 
issues. The first case, Maine v. Moulton, 106 S.Ct. 477 
(1984), was decided in December. In that case, Moulton 
and a codefendant were indicted for theft. Unknown to 
Moulton, his codefendant confessed to the pqlice and 
agreed to be a prosecution witness. The police placed a 
body wire transmitter on the codefendant when he was 
scheduled to meet Moulton to discuss defense strategy 
for their coming trial. Part of their discussion concerned 
the elimination of witnesses, a subject which Moulton 
had raised earlier. Moulton's incriminating statements 
concerning the pending theft charges were admitted at 
his trial. The Court held that Moulton's right to counsel 
had been violated: "[T]he Sixth Amendment is violated 
when the State obtains incriminating statements by 
knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have 
counsel present in a confrontation between the accused 
and a state agent." /d. at 487. The fact that the police 
were investigating a different crime- the intimidation or 
elimination of witnesses- did not change the result. 
According to the Court, the police's obligation to inves-
tigate other crimes could not be used to violate the defen-
dant's right to counsel for pending charges. 
In the second case, Henderson v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 741 
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 3499 (1985), an 
informant was placed in the defendant's cell and instruct-
ed to listen for helpful information. The cell overlooked 
the parking garage where the murder took place. The 
Second Circuit held that the police deliberately elicited 
incriminatory statements in violation of the right to coun-
sel. /d. at 744-45. 
Waiver 
There is disagreement over whether the Sixth Amend-
ment imposes a greater and different standard for waiver 
than that imposed by Miranda. Several al!thorities argue 
that it does. See Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 53 (1982) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("a suspect may waive his Fifth 
Amendment to remain silent without waiving his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel."). See also People v. 
Bladel, 421 Mich. 39, 365 N.W.2d 56, 62-70 (1984), cert. 
granted sub. nom. Michigan v. Jackson, 105 S.Ct. 2654 
(1985); Note, Proposed Requirements tor Waiver of the 
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 
363 (1982). 
Courts have adopted three distinct positions on the 
issue. First, some courts hold that the standard for waiv-
ing the right to counsel and Miranda are the same. See 
United States v. Woods, 613 F.2d 629, 634 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 920 (1980); Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 
1067, 1075 (5th Cir. 1982). At the other extreme, the 
Second Circuit has held that not only is the Miranda waiv-
er test insufficient for Sixth Amendment purposes but 
that the waiver must be obtained by a judicial officer. 
United States v, Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1152-53 (2d Cir. 
"1980) (under supervisory authority). Still other circuits 
have taken an intermediate position. See United States v. 
Karr, 742 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984) (informed of right to 
counsel and commencement of judicial proceedings). 
Impeachment 
Another area in which the Sixth Amendment and 
Miranda may differ concerns the impeachment excep-
tion. As noted earlier, an accused may be impeached 
with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda. Wheth-
er this impeachment exception applies in the right to 
counsel context is unclear. Several courts have refused 
to recognize such an exception. The defendant in United 
States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1983), was 
questioned by the police after he had been indicted and 
an hour before his arraignment, at which time counsel 
would have been appointed. The court found that this 
interrogation violated the Sixth Amendment since the 
indictment triggered his right to counsel. The prosecu-
tion, citing the impeachment exception to Miranda, 
argued that the statement was nevertheless admissible 
for impeachment. The court rejected the argument, 
distinguishing the right to counsel and Miranda. See also 
Bishop v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir. 1983). 
Appointment of Counsel 
The defendants in Williams and Massiah had retained 
counsel at the time they made incriminatory statements. 
Nevertheless, the right to counsel does not depend on 
whether counsel has been retained or appointed; the 
issue is whether the defendant was entitled to counsel. In 
Williams the Court commented: "[T]he right to coun-
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sel ... means at least that a person is entitled to the help 
of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings 
have been initiated against him .... " 430 U.S. at 398. 
The Court's action in McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 
(1965), also supports this view. In McLeod the police 
obtained a statement from an indicted defendant who 
was not represented by counsel. The Court vacated the 
judgment and remanded the case "to the Supreme Court 
of Ohio for consideration in light of Massiah v. United 
States . ... "Mcleod v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 582 (1964). On 
remand, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the conviction 
by distinguishing Massiah on the grounds that McLeod 
"was not then represented by counsel and had not even 
requested counsel." State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St.2d 60, 
62, 203 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1964). The case went back to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, which, citing Massiah, reversed 
per curiam. The Court's later cases demonstrate that 
McLeod is still good law: "[l]n McLeod v. Ohio, ... we 
summarily reversed a decision that the police could elicit 
information after indictment even though counsel had not 
yet been appointed." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
484 n.8 (1981). See also Sweat v. Arkansas, 105 S.Ct. 
933, 937 (1985) (Marshall, J. dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE 
The exclusionary rule applies not only to primary 
evidence obtained as a direct result of unconstitutional 
conduct but also to evidence later discovered and found 
to derive from that conduct. Secondary or derivative 
evidence is often referred to as "fruit of the poisonous 
tree." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). 
The genesis of this rule is Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), where the Court 
wrote: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acqui-
sition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely 
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court 
but that it shall not be used at all." /d. at 392. Neverthe-
less, from the beginning the Court has recognized excep-
tions to the derivative evidence rule. Initially, the Court 
commented that evidence derived from an independent 
untainted source was admissible. Later, the Court recog-
nized a second exception, known as the attenuation rule. 
Thus, even in the absence of an independent source, 
secondary evidence may be admissible if the "causal 
connection ... may have become so attenuated as to 
dissipate the taint." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 
338, 341 (1939). Recently, the Court recognized a third 
exception- the inevitable discovery rule. Nix v. 
Williams, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984). 
In confession cases, two distinct derivative evidence 
issues may arise: (1) where secondary evidence is 
derived from an illegally obtained confession, and (2) 
where the confession is the fruit of some other constitu-
tional violation, such as an illegal search or seizure. 
Confession as the Poisonous Tree 
Inevitable Discovery 
In Nix v. Williams, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984), the Court for 
the first time explicitly recognized the inevitable discov-
ery exception. This case involved the retrial of Brewer v. 
Williams, in which Williams' statement given in response 
to the Christian Buria1 Speech had been suppressed on 
ri{lhtl0tounseFgrotJfids.·ln a footnote; the CotJrt raised 
the possibility that evidence concerning the victim's body 
might be admissible at a retrial, even though the body 
was found as a result of the confession: 
Wbi!e neither Williams' incriminating statements them-
selves nor any testimony describing his having led the po-
lice tp the victim's body can.constitutionally be admitted into 
evidence, evidence of where the body was found and of its 
condition might well be admissible on the theory that the 
body would have been discovered in any event, even had . 
incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams. 
430 U.S. at 407 n.12. 
Thus, it was notsurprising that the prosecution attempt-
ed to introduce evidence of the condition of the body, arti-
cles and photographs of the victim's clothing, and medi-
cal and chemical tests on the body at the retrial. The 
prosecution's theory was that a search for the body, 
which had been terminated when it was learned that 
Williams had led the police to the body, would have found 
the body in any event. The 200-person search party 
stopped two and a half miles from the place where the 
body was located. 
The Supreme Court endorsed this argument, finding 
that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule did not 
require suppression in this context: "If the prosecution 
can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the information ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means- here the volunteers' 
search- then the deterrence rationale has so little basis 
that the evidence should be received. 104 S.Ct. at 2509. 
Based on the record, the Court concluded that the prose-
cution had satisfied this burden and the evidence was 
therefore· admissible. 
Attenuation 
The attenuation exception..to.the.derivative evidence 
rule differs from the inevitable discovery rule. With this 
exception, the evidence is "tainted" but the causal con-
nection, for some reason, has been dissipated or attenu-
ated. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
The principal issue in this context is whether a second 
confession obtained after an initial tainted confession is 
admissible. In United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947), 
the Court had written: 
[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by 
confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never 
thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvan-
tages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in 
the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later 
confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first. 
/d. at 540. 
Bayer, however, predated Miranda and the Court in Ore-
gon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985), found a distinction 
between coerced confessions and confessions obtained 
in violation of Miranda. This distinction, according to the 
Court, makes the subsequent reading of Miranda warn-
ings sufficient attenuation in virtually all cases. 
We must conclude that, absent deliberately coercive or 
improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere 
fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does 
not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent 
administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has 
given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should 
suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of 
the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of 
8 
faCt may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a 
rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his 
rights. /d. at 1296 (emphasis added). 
Confession as Fruit of the Poisonous Tree 
The derivative evidence doctrine also applies when a 
confession is the product of an illegal search or seizure. 
In this situation, the confession is the fruit of the poison-
ous tree. The Court has decided several cases involving 
this issue. Here, the issue is whether the connection be-
tween the Fourth Amendment violation and the confes-
sion had been dissipated or attenuated. 
· AfrestecrwitliaUt~pn:>b·able cause, the defendant in 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), was taken to the 
police station. After receiving Miranda warnings, he 
made two separate statements which implicated !Jim in a 
murder. The state court held that the Miranda warnings 
automatically purged the confession of the taint of the il-
legal arrest. The Supreme Court rejected this argument: 
[T]he Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always 
make the act [of confessing] sufficiently a product of free will 
to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal con-
nection between the illegality and the confession. They can-
not assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment viola-
tion has not been unduly exploited .... The question wheth-
er a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun 
must be answered on the facts of each case ... The Miran-
da warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determin-
ing whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an 
illegal arrest. But they are not the only factors to be consid-
ered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confes-
sion, the presence of intervening circumstances, ... and, 
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official miscon- 1 : 
duct are all relevant. /d. at 603-04. 
Applying these factors, the Court concluded that Brown's 
confession had not been purged of the taint of the illegal 
arrestbecause (i) the statement was obtained shortly 
after the arrest (within two hours), (2) no intervening 
events such as presentment to a magistrate, consultation 
with an attorney, or release from custody had occurred, 
and (3) the arrest had a "quality of purposefulness"- its 
"impropriety ... was obvious." /d. at 605. Accordingly, the 
confession was inadmissible. 
In subsequent cases, the Court has applied the Brown 
factors, although with varied results. See Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (Miranda warnings insuffi-
cient attenuation); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 
(1980) (attenuation found); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 
687 (1982) (no attenuation); Lanier v. South Carolina, 106 
S.Ct. 297 (1985). 
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